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Abstract: 
 
Purpose 
– The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of family ownership on firm performance. In 
particular the authors investigate whether family firms outperform non-family firms and whether first 
generation family firms perform better than second generation family firms in an emerging economy 
using Bangladesh as a case.  
 
Design/methodology/approach 
– This study uses a data set of 141 listed Bangladeshi non-financial companies for the period 2005-
2009. The methodology is based on multivariate regression analysis.  
 
Findings 
– The result shows that family firms perform better than their non-family counterparts. The authors 
also find that family ownership has a positive impact on firm performance. The analysis further 
reveals intergenerational differences where family firms and performance are associated positively 
only when founder members act as CEOs or chairmen. However, when descendents serve as CEOs or 
chairmen family firms are associated with poorer firm performance.  
 
Originality/value 
– The authors extend the findings of previous studies that investigate the family ownership and firm 
performance relationship in developed economy settings, but neglected emerging economies. The 
study also informs the literature about the intergenerational impact of family firms on performance in 
an emerging market. 
  
1. Introduction 
We investigate whether family firms outperform non-family firms and inter-generational effect on 
family firm performance using data from listed non-financial companies in Bangladesh. During the 
last decade different matters relating to family business and ownership have been well researched 
(e.g. Anderson et al., 2003; Chrisman et al., 2004, 2007, 2009; Schulze et al., 2003a, b; Dyer, 2006; 
Sharma, 2004). The issue of family ownership and performance is one of the most prominent areas of 
such research. The findings[1] of the studies under this area of research suggest mixed evidence. 
 
Family firms play an important role in the economic activities of Asian countries (Chang, 2003; Joh, 
2003). A significant proportion of public-listed firms in South-East Asian countries are family-owned, 
thus, the performance of such family firms has direct relevance for financial market efficiency. Recent 
studies suggest that the proportion of listed firms owned by families are as high as 68 per cent in 
Indonesia, and around 57 per cent in Thailand and Malaysia (Claessens et al., 2000; Chau and Leung, 
2006). However, limited research focusing on the link between family ownership and performance 
has been addressed in studies of developing economies (see e.g. Filatotchev et al., 2005; Yammeesri 
and Lodh, 2004; Gursoy and Aydogan, 2002; Nam, 2002; Miller et al., 2009; Piesse et al., 2007; Chu, 
2011; Kula and Tatoglu, 2006). All these studies investigated the effect of family ownership on family 
firm performance but ignored the important issues such as generational impact on firm performance. 
 
Furthermore although in South Asia family owned businesses dominate the corporate landscape 
(Sarkar and Sarkar, 2009) only a few studies explore the issue of family ownership and performance 
of countries in this region (Javid and Iqbal, 2008; Abdullah et al., 2011; Pandey et al., 2011). 
Bangladesh as a South Asian country is clearly different from other countries in terms of national 
economic environment in the region while it shares similar culture, social, political, legal, business 
ownership and institutional structure with India and Pakistan (Ali and Ahmed, 2007). A single model 
of corporate governance for these countries is unlikely and to what extent it varies across individual 
countries is unclear. Therefore, our study aims to add to this research strand by investigating whether 
family firms are better performers than non-family firms and whether first generation family 
businesses outperform the second generation counterparts in Bangladesh during the period 2005-
2009. The findings of this study may be useful to make a comparison with family firms of other South 
and South-East Asian countries. 
 
Bangladesh is an emerging economy striving for economic growth. The institutional environment in 
Bangladesh differs from that in many developed western economies in several important respects, 
including a weak market for corporate control and more concentrated ownership (Farooque et al., 
2007). The regulatory environment is also very poor. Although Bangladesh inherited Common-law 
from British colonial rule, it is characterised by weak and relatively unsophisticated legal and 
regulatory frameworks. The poor enforcement of relevant regulations often fails to protect minority 
shareholders’ rights. Thus the Bangladesh regulatory environment results in a less effective corporate 
governance system. 
 
Bangladeshi capital market is dominated by high level of family ownership and management or 
foreign owners (Imam and Malik, 2007). The prevalence of family-owned businesses plays a 
significant role in the economy. Farooque et al. (2007) find that about 78 per cent of CEOs are 
shareholders of the firms, either as founder shareholders or as descendants of founding families. The 
study also finds that five largest shareholders hold more than 50 per cent of shares in Bangladeshi 
companies. In Bangladesh, controlling families hold their shares independently in a particular 
company or group of companies. This ownership structure is, however, by no means similar to the 
pyramidal structure found in Western Europe and some other South-East Asian countries (Farooque et 
al., 2007). The dominance of family members in firm management leads to a tendency for important 
decisions to be made in family meetings which are then regularised in formal board meetings, making 
such meetings largely symbolic (Ahmed and Siddiqui, 2011). Therefore, there is risk of expropriation 
of minority shareholders’ wealth by controlling families. It is commonly perceived that families are 
there to protect their own interests capitalising the poor market, legal and institutional set up at the 
expense of minority investors’ interests. However, there is no empirical support in regards to this 
contention. 
 
Our results, based on recent data from Bangladeshi public-listed firms, indicate that family firms 
perform better than non-family firms. We also document a positive relationship between family 
ownership and firm performance. Given that family wealth is closely related to the welfare of the 
family businesses, family members have incentives to increase their wealth by improving firm 
performance. Previous studies (Morck et al., 1988; Pérez-González, 2006) suggest that generations of 
family firms may have different impacts on firm performance. Accordingly, we further investigate the 
intergenerational impact of family firms on performance. We document that first generation family 
firms perform better than second generation family firms. This is consistent with the argument that 
first generation family members are more concerned about the performance of family firms because it 
might affect their reputation. Moreover, family wealth is closely related to the welfare of the family 
businesses, and thus first generation family members have incentives to increase their wealth by 
improving firm performance. Further, founders tend to pass their wealth to their descendents rather 
than consuming the assets only for their generations. 
 
We contribute to the literature in a number of ways. First, this study looks at the effect of family 
ownership on firm performance in an emerging market which is characterised by family ownership 
and management. Second, we also examine the intergenerational impact of family firms on 
performance. Overall this study helps to increase our level of understanding with regards to family 
firms in an emerging economy. Particularly, we use a sample of Bangladeshi public listed firms and 
the findings of this study may be useful to make a comparison with family firms in other countries. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes institutional background of 
Bangladesh, Section 3 reviews related literature and develops two hypotheses. Section 4 describes 
research methodology, followed by the presentation of the hypotheses testing in Section 5, and the 
results of several robustness tests in Section 6. Section 7 provides conclusions and limitations of the 
study. 
 
 
 
2. Institutional background of Bangladesh 
After its independence in 1971, the Government of Bangladesh adopted a socialist policy and took all 
the industries under government control. However, as the public sector industries started performing 
poorly, and donor agencies promoting a free market economy started applying pressure on the 
government, the public sector was opened up for private investment. Uddin and Hopper (2003) report 
that although a few privatised firms were large, it was the small firms that got privatised as these were 
easier to privatise. The study also reports that many of the privatised state owned industries were 
purchased by single owners, who preferred to keep the ownership of the business with their families. 
A survey conducted by Sobhan and Werner (2003) find that an overwhelming majority (73 per cent) 
of the boards of non-bank listed companies are heavily dominated by sponsor shareholders “who 
generally belong to a single family- the father as the chairman and the son as the managing director is 
the norm” (Sobhan and Werner, 2003, p. 34). 
 
The microstructure of corporate governance institutions in Bangladesh comprises both government 
and non-government bodies including the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Ministry of 
Finance, Central Bank (Bangladesh Bank), Registrar of Joint Stock Companies (RJSC), Dhaka Stock 
Exchange (DSE), Chittagong Stock Exchange (CSE), and the Institute of Chartered Accountant of 
Bangladesh. Some of the major legislative and regulatory requirements mandating Bangladeshi 
companies include: the Companies Act 1994, SEC Act 1993, Bangladesh Bank Order 1972, Banking 
Companies Act 1991, Financial Institutions Act 1993, Bankruptcy Act 1997, Insurance Act 1938 and 
Regulation 1958, Income Tax Ordinance 1984, DSE and CSE listing rules, Bangladesh Accounting 
Standards, and Bangladesh Standards on Auditing. 
 
Like many other emerging economies[2], some of the institutional features of Bangladesh include a 
less developed capital market (World Bank, 2009), a least weak-form of efficient stock market (Islam 
and Khaled, 2005), absence of an active market for corporate control, a passive managerial labour 
market, and poor incentive contracts for management (Farooque et al., 2007). Siddiqui (2010) in his 
recent review of corporate governance within the Bangladesh corporate sector is critical of high 
ownership concentration, family dominance, shareholder activism and poor enforcement and 
monitoring of regulations. The poor legal and regulatory framework and its enforcement also hinder 
the market’s potential growth. In the absence of market-based monitoring and control measures, 
ownership based monitoring and control is expected to function as a core governance mechanism. 
 
3. Literature review and hypotheses development 
The family shareholders are widely perceived as the owners who control the firms largely belonging 
to them and their own families. Therefore, they have more incentives to monitor the management and 
maximise firm performance. There are several studies that suggest the benefits of family firms. 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that family members with large equity ownership might have 
substantial economic incentives to diminish agency conflict and increase firm performance. James 
(1999) note that families have longer investment horizons, resulting in greater investment efficiency. 
Stein (1988) argue that firms with a longer investment horizons suffer less from managerial myopia 
and will not sacrifice good investment in order to boost current earnings. The long-term nature of 
family ownership helps to build family reputation that might influence their relationship with 
customers and external suppliers (Anderson et al., 2003). 
 
Previous research finds that family firms outperform their non-family counterparts (Anderson and 
Reeb, 2003; Lee, 2006; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Chrisman et al., 2007 in USA, Kowalewski et al., 
2010 in Poland; Mishra et al., 2001 in Norway, Yammeesri and Lodh, 2004 in Thailand; Piesse et al., 
2007; and Chu, 2011 in Taiwan). Collectively, the findings of these studies suggest that family 
owners have motivations to perform better monitoring which in turn results in better firm 
performance. 
 
There can be several potential costs associated with family ownership. Some managerial actions in 
family controlled firms may benefit themselves at the expense of firm performance because of their 
substantial ownership of cash flow rights (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). The combination of 
management and control might lead to sub-optimal investment decisions since the interests of the 
family members may not necessarily be in line with those of minority shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 
1985). They may get entrenched and their entrenchment in a firm may provide them incentives to 
exchange profits for private rents, instead of maximising firm value (Faccio et al., 2001). Sometimes 
their influence in selecting managers and directors provide greater managerial entrenchment, which 
leads to poor performance since external parties can hardly capture control over the firm. Moreover, 
families often tend to favour family members in filling executive management positions and hence, 
restrict the labour pool to a very small group from which to obtain qualified and capable talent, which 
potentially leads to competitive disadvantages for family firms (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). 
 
Accordingly, previous studies also find that family ownership has a negative impact on performance 
and family firms perform worse than their non-family counterparts (Gursoy and Aydogan, 2002 in 
Turkey, Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003 and Oreland, 2007 in Sweden). Collectively, the findings of 
these studies suggest that entrenched family owners have lack of motivations to perform monitoring 
and thus expropriate minority shareholders (Type 2 agency problem) which in turn results in poor 
firm performance. 
 
Given that controlling families have strong motivations to undertake a long-term view and see their 
firms to succeed, family owners would be better able to utilise their power, networks and connections 
to advantage their family businesses’ economic benefits and improve performance. It can also be 
argued that in the case of non-family firms, however, ownership tends to be more diverse and the risk 
of agency problems related to the separation of owners and management (Type 1 agency problem) 
tend to be higher. Consequently, relative to family firms, the personal connections and motivations to 
safeguard the firm among non-family firm management would be low with stronger focus on shorter-
term goals and a higher risk of managerial entrenchment. We therefore propose that: 
 
H1. Family firms perform better than their non-family counterparts. 
 
It is argued that family succession may not guarantee firm success. Empirical evidence as provided by 
Morck et al. (1988) and Pérez-González (2006) suggest that family succession can have negative 
impacts on firm performance. In general, founders as pioneers in the business bring innovation and 
entrepreneurial skills to their firms (Morck et al., 1988). Villalonga and Amit (2006) find that family 
ownership creates value for all shareholders only when the founder is active in the firm (either as 
CEO or as Chairman with a hired CEO). Similarly, Anderson and Reeb (2003) suggest that founders 
tend to have greater amount of emotional investment in the business, resulting in long-term vision and 
investment horizons for the firm. As such, founders have many incentives to increase their wealth by 
improving firm performance. 
 
By contrast, it is contended that descendants are often appointed on the board just to continue 
inheritances, and thus may lack the requisite skills and motivations to adequately manage the firms 
(Bennedsen et al., 2007). Another argument is that descendent managers may lack the same values 
and aspirations as founder managers, and thus managerial succession risks poorer firm performance 
with an increase in work routine disruptions, unclear command protocols and employee insecurity 
(Haveman and Khaire, 2004; Molly et al., 2010). Molly et al. (2010) using a sample of small to 
medium sized US firms fail to find that family firm succession affects firm profitability. However, 
Pérez-González (2006) investigates the impact of inherited CEO positions on the performance of 
publically traded US firms and find that firms that appoint family CEOs who did not attend 
“selective” undergraduate institutions (e.g. those institutions which considered applicants who ranked 
in the top 50 per cent of their graduating class) show poorer performance compared to succeeding 
family CEOs with such qualifications. They further assert that an unrivalled family heir in the 
management tends to use a firm’s resources to serve his/her own needs. 
 
The findings from western economies provide evidence of the importance of generational effect on 
family firm performance. However, no prior studies investigate this issue in the context of a 
developing economy. This study therefore attempts to investigate whether founding family firms in 
Bangladesh outperform second generation family firms. 
 
On the basis of above discussion we propose the following hypothesis: 
 
H2. First generation family firms perform better than second generation family firms. 
 
4. Research design 
4.1 Sample  
This study considers 141 non-financial companies listed with DSE in Bangladesh from 2005 to 2009, 
producing a total sample of 705 firm-year observations. The DSE was formed in 1954 and registered 
as a limited liability company. Due to missing information, we then had to exclude 114 firm year 
observations, yielding a final sample of 591 firm-year observations. The data for our analysis comes 
from multiple sources of secondary data. Financial data is collected from the annual reports of the 
sample companies listed on the stock exchange. Stock price data is obtained from the DataStream 
database. The family ownership and corporate governance data were hand collected from the 
corporate governance disclosures, shareholding information and directors’ report contained in annual 
reports. 
 
4.2 Measuring family firms  
Following prior studies we identify family firms as being firms in which 20 per cent of a firm's share 
or voting rights (either direct or indirect) are held by family block holders; and at least one member of 
a controlling family holds a managerial position such as board member, CEO or chairman 
(Bartholomeusz and Tanewski, 2006; Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009; Cascino et al., 2010). Family 
relationships and shareholdings pattern were collected from prospectus of the listed companies, 
annual reports and company web sites. We use a dummy variable and set equal to 1 if the firm is 
considered to be a family firm and 0 otherwise. 
 
From Table I, it is observed that family firms are present in 60.74 per cent of the total sample. The 
family firms are prevalent in various sectors such as cement (17), ceramics (13), engineering (52), 
food (58), information technology (11), jute (nine), paper and printing (ten), miscellaneous (22), 
pharmaceuticals (52), service and real estate (12), tannery (nine) and textile (94). This study controls 
industry affiliations for empirical analysis. 
 
4.3 Model specification  
The following OLS[3] model is used to test H1 and H2: 
 
The dependent variable measuring firm performance is return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q. ROA 
is measured as earnings before interest and taxes to book value of total assets (Jackling and Johl, 
2009), and it represents how profitable a company is relative to its total assets. In general, ROA is 
directly related to the management’s ability to efficiently utilise corporate assets, which ultimately 
belong to shareholders. Tobin’s Q is defined as the market value of equity plus the book value of total 
debt divided by book value of total assets (Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009). Tobin’s Q is popularly adopted 
as a measure of firm performance because it reflects the market expectations of future earnings. 
 
We control for a number of standard variables that may affect firm performance such as board 
independence, firm size, firm age, risk, leverage, board ownership, growth. 
 
We define board independence as the proportion of independent directors on the board, who do not 
have any material interest into the firm (denoted as board independence) (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). 
Firm size – larger firms may have fewer growth opportunities (Morck et al., 1988) and more 
coordination problem which may negatively influence its performance. On the other hand, larger 
firms tend to make hefty investments and often receive preferential treatment which may enhance 
firm performance (Boeker, 1997). Firm size is measured as a natural logarithm of total assets 
(Yermack, 1996). Firm age – Boone et al. (2007) argue that complexity increases with the firm age. 
Therefore, an uncertain relationship of firm age on board characteristics as well as firm performance 
is expected. Age of the firm is calculated by taking the natural log of the number of year since the 
firm’s inception (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). Risk – Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that the greater 
the level of risk in the business environment, the greater the impact of board structure on firm value. 
Therefore, we expect a negative sign for the coefficient of risk. Consistent with previous literature this 
study measures firm risk as the standard deviation of a firm’s daily stock return over the prior 12-
month period (Boone et al., 2007). Leverage – the leverage of a firm could lead to external corporate 
control (Chen and Jaggi, 2000). Debt holder would actively monitor the capital structure of a firm to 
protect their own interests (Hutchinson and Gul, 2004). Therefore leverage influences firm 
performance through monitoring activities by debt holders. On the other hand, a negative relation 
could be expected between leverage and performance according to the pecking order theory whereby, 
a firm prefers to fund operations through retained earnings rather than debt and equity (Myers, 1984). 
Leverage is measured by taking the ratio of book value of total debt and book value of total assets 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003). Board ownership – consistent with prior studies we use the board 
ownership variable as the percentage of directors’ total shareholdings (excluding family directors 
ownership) on the board (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). Growth – faster growth is more likely to be 
positively correlated with financial performance. On the other hand, growth may lead to a range of 
internal challenges and difficulties and therefore may have detrimental effects on performance 
(Kazanjian, 1988). The growth of a firm is measured as the difference between the operating revenue 
of prior year and current year divided by prior year operating revenue. Block – a dummy variable 
equals 1 if there is the presence of large shareholders other than family shareholders who own at least 
10 per cent share ownership and otherwise 0. We use year and industry dummies in our regression[4] 
model. We apply White's (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors for all regression 
analyses performed in this study. Furthermore, we apply the firm clustering technique for all the 
analyses because multiple observations from the same firm (but from different years) are included in 
our data set. 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Descriptive statistics  
Panel A of Table II shows that the average ROA and Tobin's Q of our sample firms are 0.080 and 
1.589, respectively. With regards to ownership structure, board of directors (excluding family 
directors) and family members hold an average of 9.00 and 28 per cent of shares, respectively. 
Further, the average growth of firms is 24 per cent and average blockholder is about 65 per cent. The 
average firm age is nearly 23 years and the average firm size is 8.70 (natural logarithm of total assets). 
 
Panel B of Table II presents the difference of mean tests for key variables between family and non-
family firms. Family firms represent 60.74 per cent of the sample. Family firms have a significantly 
lower proportion of independent directors (6.7 vs 7.77 per cent). On average, family firms exhibit 
better performance than non-family firms (ROA: 0.088; Tobin's Q: 1.682 vs ROA: 0.068; Tobin's Q: 
1.445). The average share ownership of board of directors (excluding family members) also 
significantly differs between family (3.3 per cent) and non-family firms (17.9 per cent). Non-family 
firms have a significantly higher proportion of foreign and government ownership than family firms. 
There are significant differences in growth and blockholder ownership between family and non-
family firms. The univariate analysis also shows that several variables such as risk, firm age and firm 
size differ significantly between family and non-family firms. 
 
Table III provides a simple correlation matrix for the key variables in the analysis. Family firm has a 
positive correlation with ROA and Tobin's Q. In addition, consistent with previous studies, this study 
finds that family firm is negatively correlated with firm size; firm age and risk (see Anderson and 
Reeb, 2003). The proportion of independent directors is positive and significantly correlated with 
ROA. 
 
 
5.2 Hypothesis test results  
The main focus of our analysis is to examine whether family firms outperform their non-family 
counterparts. The results are reported in Panel A of Table IV. First we run an OLS regression taking 
ROA as a dependent variable. In model 1 we find that coefficient of family firm variable is positive 
and significant (β=0.017, p<0.05). In other words we document that family firms perform better than 
their non-family counterparts. This supports H1. This is consistent with the findings of Piesse et al. 
(2007), Filatotchev et al. (2005) and Anderson and Reeb (2003) and suggests that family firms in 
Bangladesh have motivation to perform more effective monitoring functions which in turn results in 
better firm performance. With respect to the control variables, we find that board independence, firm 
size and growth have significantly positive impacts on performance. A positive significant coefficient 
of board independence implies better monitoring by the outside directors documented in the previous 
study (Jackling and Johl, 2009). This study also notes negative and significant impacts of risk, 
leverage and block (less family) dummy variables on firm performance. This is consistent with the 
findings of Anderson and Reeb (2003). A negative significant coefficient of block dummy variable 
implies that large share holder (other than family) tends to expropriate minority shareholders which 
worsens firm performance. 
 
In model 2 we explore the relationship between family ownership and firm performance. We find a 
positive significant coefficient (β=0.022, p<0.05) of family ownership variable. In other words, it 
implies that higher family ownership results in better firm performance. Our result is consistent with 
the findings of Piesse et al. (2007) and Anderson and Reeb (2003). The results in regards to the 
coefficients of control variables are consistent with the results of control variables reported in model 
1. 
 
In model 3 we investigate the intergenerational impact of family firms on performance. For this 
purpose we identify the generation of our family firms – first generation family firm when a founder 
occupies the position of CEO or chairman of the board and second generation family firm when a 
descendent occupies the position of CEO or chairman of the board. Thereafter we introduce two 
dummy variables in our original model. The dummy variables are first (second) generation dummy 
variable equals 1 if an observation is a first (second) generation family firm observation and 0 
otherwise. We find a positive significant coefficient (β=0.019, p<0.05) of first generation dummy 
variable. This supports H2. It implies that first generation family firms improve firm performance. 
This is also consistent with the findings of Morck et al. (1988) and Villalonga and Amit (2006) who 
argue that founders bring more skills and knowledge to the business which helps to improve 
performance. We also document a negative insignificant coefficient of second generation family 
firms, which suggests that second generation family firms deteriorate firm performance. These results 
are also aligned with the argument by Pérez-González, (2006) who contends that in family firms most 
of the time management and control is transferred to the descendents to continue family inheritances 
regardless of skill, expertise and education of family members. With respect to the control variables, 
we find that board independence, firm size and growth have significantly positive impacts on 
performance. However, risk, leverage and block (less family) dummy variables have negative 
significant impacts on firm performance. 
 
When we consider Tobin's Q as a performance measure in panel B of Table IV we find that in model 
1 family firms outperform their non-family counterparts. In model 2 we find a positive significant 
relationship between family ownership and performance. Once again in model 3, we find that first 
generation family firms perform better than second generation family firms. Overall, these results are 
similar to our findings in panel A. 
 
6. Further analysis 
6.1 Alternative definition of family firms  
We use alternative definitions of family firms as a part of robustness of our results. The results are 
presented in Table V. In panel A performance is measured by ROA. First, in model 1 we define a firm 
as a family firm where family members hold at least 50 per cent of a firm's share (voting rights) (Ang 
et al., 2000; Van den Berghe and Carchon, 2002). Furthermore, we require that at least one member of 
the controlling family holds a managerial position (i.e. board member, CEO or chairman). We use a 
dummy variable to identify the family firms and set equal to 1 if the firm is considered to be family 
firm and 0 otherwise. When we use this alternative definition, the number of family firms comes 
down to 171. Thereafter we run our model. We once again find that family firms perform better than 
their non-family counterparts. 
 
In model 2 we define a family firm based on family involvement in the managerial position (Chua et 
al., 1999 and Chrisman et al., 2005) and rerun our model. We use a dummy variable to identify the 
family firms and set equal to 1 if the firm is considered to be family firm and 0 otherwise. We 
document a positive insignificant coefficient of family firm. In other words we fail to document that 
family firms outperform non-family firms. One possible reason of such an insignificant finding is that 
in the context of Bangladesh family involvement alone is not enough to influence performance. 
 
In the next model (model 3) we examine whether family firms run by the lone founder shows better 
performance (Miller et al., 2007). We use a dummy variable to identify the family firms run by the 
lone founder and set equal to 1 and 0 otherwise. We document a positive insignificant coefficient of 
lone founder variable. In other words the lone founder does not have any significance in our data set. 
Our result is in contrast to the findings of Miller et al. (2007). 
 
When we consider Tobin's Q as a performance measure in panel B of Table V we find that in model 1 
family firms outperform their non-family counterparts using first alternative definition of family 
firms. In model 2 we fail to find a significant coefficient using the second alternative definition of 
family firms. In model 3 we do not document any significant impact of lone founder on firm 
performance. Overall these results are similar to our findings in panel A. 
 
6.2 Alternative measure of performance  
One can easily argue that earnings can be influenced by earnings management and therefore, ROA as 
a measure of performance could be biased. Therefore motivated by the findings of Khan et al. (2014) 
we also use discretionary accruals adjusted performance measure and rerun our model. Our 
discretionary accruals adjusted measure of performance (AROA) is calculated by taking the 
difference between ROA and the level of discretionary accruals. We use cross-sectional version of the 
modified-Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995) to estimate discretionary accruals. Under this model, the 
level of discretionary accruals for a particular firm is calculated as the difference between the firm's 
total accruals and its non-discretionary accruals (NDAC), as estimated with the following equation: 
  
where NDACt is the non-discretionary accruals in year t; TAt−1 the total assets in year t−1; ΔREVt 
the change in revenue of firm i in year t; ΔARt the change of accounts receivable of firm i in year t; 
PPEt the property plant and equipment of firm i in year t. 
 
The results are reported in Table VI. In model 1 we find that family firms perform better than non-
family firms. In model 2 we document that family ownership has a positive significant impact on 
performance. In model 3 our results marginally support that first generation firms perform better than 
second generation firms. Overall, these findings are consistent with our main findings. 
 
6.3 Lag independent variables  
It may be argued that contemporaneous relationships are not appropriate to examine a causal 
relationship we use in our study given the time family owners may need to improve performance. 
Accordingly, we lag all the independent variables by one year to allow for the effect of any change to 
show up in firm behaviour and performance. Then we rerun our models. The results are reported in 
Table VII. Overall, we do not find any qualitative differences to the results reported earlier. 
 
6.4 Other  
A series of tests were conducted to test the robustness of our results. While the results are not 
tabulated to conserve space, they are available from the authors upon request. First, the sample used in 
this study includes five years of observations. If the residuals in our regressions are correlated, the 
coefficients on the test and control variables are biased. To mitigate this concern, we adopt Fama-
MacBeth regressions and alternative methods of computing significance levels (Barth, 1994). In 
Fama-MacBeth regressions, the mean estimate is the average of the coefficients in annual regressions, 
and the t-value is the t-statistic based on five estimated coefficients. Thereafter we estimate the p-
values accordingly. In our first model we document that family firms perform better than non-family 
firms. We also document that family ownership has a positive significant impact on firm performance 
in the second model. In our last model we document that first generation family firms perform better 
than second generation family firms. Second, we test for a non-linear relationship between family 
ownership and firm performance using both ROA and Tobin's Q as measures of performance. We use 
a quadratic specification of family ownership and rerun our model. For both measures we find that 
family ownership has positive significant coefficients. However, family ownership squared has 
negative and insignificant coefficients. Our results suggest that quadratic specification of family 
ownership is not suitable for our data set. Third, we use an alternative measure of firm performance. 
In particular we use EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation scaled by the book 
value of total assets) instead of ROA and rerun our regressions. We once again document that family 
firms outperforms non-family firms, family ownership has a positive significant impact on firm 
performance and first generation family firms are better performers than their second generation 
counterparts. Fourth, we also address the issue of potential missing observation bias by using a subset 
of 112 firms that are available for the entire sample period. This study once again finds that family 
firms perform better than non-family firms. Furthermore for a subsample of 70 family firms for which 
data is available for the whole study period we document that first generation family firms outperform 
their second generation counterparts. Finally, we introduce a loss dummy variable equals 1 when a 
firm incurs a loss in a particular year and 0 otherwise in our model when performance is measured by 
Tobin's Q. However, our results with respect to family firm, family ownership and first generation 
variables remain unchanged. 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
We argue that ownership in Bangladesh is largely concentrated in the hands of a few people and that 
top shareholders belong mostly to controlling families. Given the potential costs and benefits of 
family control, the issue of family dominance and its impact on performance is an empirical matter. 
Accordingly, we examine whether family ownership has a positive impact on firm performance and 
whether family firms perform better than non-family firms in an emerging economy setting taking 
Bangladesh as a case. We also investigate whether family firm generations have a different impact on 
performance. This paper contains several interesting results. First, using both profitability-based and 
market-based measures of firm performance (ROA and Tobin's Q) this study finds that Bangladeshi 
family firms perform better than non-family firms. We also find that family ownership has a positive 
significant impact on firm performance. Given that family wealth is closely related to the welfare of 
the family businesses, family members have incentives to ensure more effective monitoring and 
increase their wealth by improving firm performance. Further, we also reveal that the better 
performance in family firms stems from those firms when founder members serve as CEOs or 
chairmen (first generation family firms). One interpretation is that founders tend to pass the assets of 
their businesses on to their descendents rather than consuming the wealth only for their generations. 
Therefore, they have the motivation to improve performance. 
 
The overall findings of our study suggests that the socio-political characteristics of Bangladesh such 
as weak capital market, poor legal environment, and inadequate level of knowledge possessed by the 
minority shareholders, offer incentives for families to continue their historical dominance. Given that 
family ownership has positive impact on firm performance it may be instrumental for allowing family 
dominance to prevail in the context of a developing country like Bangladesh. 
 
Our study extends the findings of previous research that investigate the family ownership and firm 
performance relationship in developing economy settings, but neglected the issue of family 
generational impact. While our results are probably dependent on Bangladesh's institutional 
environment, learning the extent to which the results do generalise will help us better understand how 
institutional features matter for family ownership and firm performance relationship. Thus, further 
studies in different jurisdictions on the issues we raise in this study are warranted. 
 
One of major limitation of this study is that family firms are very difficult to identify and define. 
Previous study adopted multiple research approaches to identify and define family firms which may 
also affect the validity of studies of family business (Mroczkowski and Tanewski, 2007). For 
example, Villalonga and Amit (2006) document that the definition of family firms affects the findings 
of their study. Furthermore, we have not controlled for the level of expertise of family members who 
work as board members in general. Several prior studies suggest that educational background of the 
board of directors is an important determinant of board expertise which may impact on performance 
(Smith et al., 2006). However, we could not test the impact of educational background of family 
members due to lack of availability of such data. Finally, our sample includes the companies listed on 
the DSE. Due to unavailability of annual reports we could not consider the companies listed with the 
other stock exchange of the country, i.e. the CSE . Therefore we acknowledge that the findings of this 
study are subject to the bias of sample selection. 
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Notes  
 
For example Mishra et al. (2001), Anderson and Reeb (2003), Yammeesri and Lodh (2004), Lee 
(2006), Maury (2006), Villalonga and Amit (2006), Barontini and Caprio (2006), Martinez et al. 
(2007), Chrisman et al. (2007), Adams et al. (2009) and Kowalewski et al. (2010) document a positive 
impact on performance. Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) and Oreland (2007) document a negative 
impact on performance. Filatotchev et al. (2005), Castillo and Wakefield (2006) and Sciascia and 
Mazzola (2008) do not find any significant effect between family ownership and firm performance. 
 
In terms of GDP, Bangladesh is the 44th largest economy in the world (IMF, 2010) 
 
 
Prior research suggests that the level of family ownership can be endogenous (Villalonga and Amit, 
2006). This is consistent, for example, that family owners may change their level of ownership based 
on the performance of the firms. Accordingly, we perform the Hausman test proposed by Davidson 
and Mackinnon (1993), to test whether family ownership is endogenously determined. This is done by 
regressing family ownership on the explanatory and control variables used to explain our dependent 
variable as well as instrumental variables (natural log market value of equity and first lag of family 
ownership) that are correlated with family ownership in our first OLS regression. Then using the 
residual from this first regression, it is used as an additional regressor for the performance regression. 
The results of the second regression suggest that residual obtained in the first regression is not 
significantly different from zero. This suggests that family ownership is not endogenously determined 
in our setting. Hence an OLS regression is an appropriate model for our study. 
 
There are a number of tests available to evaluate the specification of our model (see Greene, 2003, pp. 
283-333). Accordingly, we perform a test to evaluate the adequacy of our model specification. Our 
simple pooled model will outperform the fixed effect model if the null hypothesis of homogeneity of 
individual effects, which can be tested with an F-test, is rejected. 
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